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The Bologna Process has been widely portrayed as a ‘success story’. On the one
hand, it is often presented as an (infrequent) instance of the effective functioning of
a mode of soft law governance, serving in the European context as something of a
precursor for the European Union’s subsequent development of the Open Method of
Co-ordination (Rav 2008; Haskell 2009). On the other hand, it is also often seen as
having provided a model for regional cooperation in higher education subsequently
followed in other global regions (Huisman 2012) or, in more multipolar terms, as one
of the major models of a ‘higher education regionalism’ that has also seen significant
developments elsewhere (Chou and Ravinet 2015).
Yet, somewhat paradoxically, the period since the formal consolidation of the
process as the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) in 2010 has been marked
by an increasing questioning of its core purpose or continuing utility. For example,
a key strategy document submitted to the 2015 Yerevan ministerial meeting, on the
basis of deliberations in the Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG), affirmed in its
opening sentence that the EHEA ‘has come to a turning point where a new sense
of direction is needed in order to move ahead’ (EHEA 2015a). Commentators have
similarly asked whether the process has ‘exhausted’ itself (Harmsen 2015: 795) or
simply risks ‘running out of steam’ (Bergan and Deca 2018: 298–302).
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These interrogations are, in part, the product of the very success of the Bologna
Process. It has undoubtedly created an “agora” (Zgaga 2012: 30–32) or shared higher
education policy space at a continental level (cf. Dakowska and Velarde 2018) where
none previously existed. Yet, at the same time, this growing questioning of the pro-
cess also stems from its (perceived or real) shortcomings. It is clear that the imple-
mentation of key Bologna commitments, seeking to facilitate the comparability and
recognition of qualifications and with it enhanced continent-wide mobility, remains
markedly uneven across the 48 participating countries (Sin et al. 2016; Huisman
2019). Indeed, there is significant sentiment that, after an initial wave of reforms
during the first decade of the process, the more recent period has perhaps seen some-
thing of a slowing down, if not a stalling of reforms (cf. Viðarsdoóttir 2018). This, in
turn, could be seen as pointing to the potential limits of a soft law governance process
itself. At the same time, attention has also been focused on a further expansion of the
objectives or topics to be covered within the process—indicating an aspiration for
renewal beyond an initial agenda focused primarily on issues of structural reform.1
It is against this background that the present paper is conceived, intended—to
use the (earlier) terms of the Bologna Process itself—as a ‘stocktaking’ exercise.
The paper broadly surveys the current state of play as regards the EHEA, probing
the major topics of current discussion, likely medium-term developments, and what
this portends for the future direction(s) of this now twenty-year-old experience of
regional higher education cooperation. To this end, the first three sections of the
paper examine: the recent, intensified treatment of the issue of non-implementation;
the development of the EHEA as a ‘policy forum’ as regards both its member states
and wider international cooperation through the Bologna Policy Forum; and the role
of the EHEA as a ‘community of values’, focusing on its capabilities and limits as
regards the promotion and/or enforcement of those values. The paper concentrates on
the period since the formal founding of the EHEA at the Budapest-Viennaministerial
conference in 2010, with a particular emphasis on the more recent period encom-
passing the Yerevan (2015b) and Paris (citeyearEHEA18a) ministerial meetings. It
draws both on publicly available documentary sources and commentaries and on the
authors’ own involvement in different aspects of the Bologna Process.2
1One of the working groups constituted after the 2015 Yerevan ministerial meeting focused on
’policy development for new EHEA goals’ (EHEA 2017). As Bergan and Deca (2018: 302) note,
however, the group ’seems to have faced serious difficulties in defining clear policy measures that
lend themselves to the particular context of the EHEA’.
2Ligia Deca was a member of the Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG) in 2008–2010 as the Chair-
person of the European Students’ Union and was also the Head of the Bologna Secretariat in
2010–2012, hosted by Romania. In her latter capacity, she was involved in the drafting of the
Bucharest communiqué (2012) and coordinated the organisation of the 2012 EHEA ministerial
conference.
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1 (Non-)Implementation
Preparations for the formal establishment of the EHEA in the mid- to late- 2000s saw
discussions within the BFUG as to whether a ‘hardening’ of the essentially soft gov-
ernance process might be either possible or desirable. There was some discussion as
to whether a formal legal instrument might be adopted on the model of the Council of
Europe/UNESCO Lisbon Recognition Convention and, relatedly, whether provision
might be made for the exclusion or suspension of non-compliant contracting states
(Zgaga 2012: 24). In a similar vein, there was some consideration as to whether the
move from the ‘informal’ Bologna Process to the more formally constituted EHEA
might be used as a form of selection mechanism, possibly restricting membership
to only those states that had already met key commitments or, alternatively, placing
conditions on the membership of those states that had not yet achieved such a level of
compliance (Bergan and Deca 2018: 309). These discussions within the process also
found an echo in (and were to some extent reinforced by) the academic literature.
Most notably, Garben’s (2011; 2010) critical legal analysis of the Bologna Process
put forward the argument that it both could and should have been adopted through
the instruments of EU law, which, in her view, would have provided for more effec-
tive implementation as well as for a more transparent decision-making process. Such
arguments, however, were able to gain little political foothold; any idea of putting
the process on a more formal legal basis was relatively quickly taken off the table.
With such a ‘legal’ option being an apparent non-starter, this left essentially two
competing perspectives as to how implementation might be conceived within the
framework of the EHEA (as contrasted in Bergan and Deca 2018: 310). On the one
hand, there are those who view the process primarily in terms of policy learning (e.g.
Harmsen 2015). In this view, the EHEA is ‘essentially an area of peer learning, where
countries develop good practice by learning from each other but where it is either not
desirable or not possible—or neither desirable nor possible—to take measures where
countries donot implement commitments’ (Bergan andDeca2018: 310).On the other
hand, there are those who argue that the EHEA, while significantly relying on peer
learning, nevertheless requires some form of effective enforcement mechanism so as
to maintain its credibility and thus to secure the existence of a pan-European higher
education space inwhich qualifications are readily and unproblematically recognised
across borders (e.g. Bergan 2015).Viðarsdoóttir3 (2018: 391–392) evocativelymakes
the case for this latter vision of the process, drawing a strong distinction between
an initially voluntary participation and the need, nevertheless, to ensure consistent
compliance once that initial commitment has been undertaken:
It is, however, essential that for the Bologna Process to function, the voluntary nature of
the agreement only applies to participation but never to implementation. In short–once you
sign up to take part in the Bologna Process, you should not expect to find yourself in front
of a smoörgaåsbord of educational delicacies where you might choose to have two slices of
salmon but ignore both the ham sandwiches and the potato salad. Instead, you sit down to
3The author, an official in the Icelandic Ministry of Education, was also a co-chair of the Non-
implementation Advisory Group (2016–2018) whose work is discussed below.
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a set lunch, carefully nutritionally balanced but not catered to individual tastes. It may look
less appetising than the smoörgaåsbord but its constituent parts have been carefully thought
through so that unless you consume all the individual components you miss out on its full
benefits and it will function less than optimally.
The presentation of these two positions is necessarily somewhat stylised, and an
understanding of the underlying dynamics of (non-)compliance within the EHEA
undoubtedly requires a more fine-grained analysis of the possibilities and limits
offered by the full spectrum of instruments—including positive socialisation, ‘name
and shame’ mechanisms and the adoption of more formal sanctions—potentially
operable within a soft governance framework. Nevertheless, the basic distinction
between a predominately ‘peer learning’ approach, on the hand, and an approach
concerned to ensure the ‘collective enforcement’ of commitments, on the other, may
usefully serve to frame much of the discussion surrounding (non-)implementation
in the EHEA from 2010 onwards.
1.1 From Bucharest to Yerevan
The 2012 Bucharest ministerial conference saw some moves in the direction of
strengthening implementation within the EHEA. Following on the decision taken
at the 2009 Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve ministerial conference, the previous ‘stock-
taking’ exercises were replaced by a ‘Bologna Process Implementation Report’,
developing more fine-grained indicators of compliance with key commitments. Con-
sequently, as observed in the report, ‘the colour dark green is less prevalent in some
action lines than before’ (EACEA 2012: 7)—i.e. relative to the ‘traffic light’ (green-
amber-red) bands used to indicate compliance, fewer countries were able to meet
the more rigorous standards applied for a determination of full compliance. The
final communiqué of the Bucharest meeting (EHEA 2012) also stated that the EHEA
would ‘encourage the development of a systemof voluntary peer learning and review-
ing in countries that request it’, with a view to helping ‘to assess the level of imple-
mentation of Bologna reforms and promote good practices’. This commitment in the
Bucharest communiqué was made having in mind the already existing EU funded
peer learning activities (PLA) and with a view to better use EU funds for Bologna
Process implementation.
Three years later, at the Yerevan ministerial conference, the issue of non-
implementation figured with much greater prominence in the final communiqué.
While noting the progress that had been made by the Bologna Process, the introduc-
tory preamble to the communiqué nevertheless also underlined that ‘implementation
of the structural reforms is uneven and the tools are sometimes used incorrectly or in
bureaucratic or superficial ways’ (EHEA 2015b). This was then amplified later on in
the document, with a call to redouble efforts to ensure ‘full and coherent implemen-
tation of agreed reforms at the national level’, to be achieved by further instilling a
vision of the ‘shared ownership’ of those reforms on the part of policy-makers and
academic communities, while also more actively engaging stakeholders.
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The framing of the issue of non-implementation broadly reflected the logic of
the ‘collective enforcement’ position outlined above, affirming that the credibility of
the EHEA crucially depends on the existence of effective mechanisms to ensure that
consistent standards of compliance are maintained. In the words of the communiqué:
Non-implementation in some countries undermines the functioning and credibility of the
whole EHEA. We need more precise measurement of performance as a basis for reporting
from member countries. Through policy dialogue and exchange of good practice, we will
provide targeted support to member countries experiencing difficulties in implementing the
agreed goals and enable those who wish to go further to do so (EHEA 2015b).
On the basis of the Yerevan conclusions, an advisory group was then established
to deal specifically with the issue of ‘non-implementation’, working in liaison with
the existing working groups on monitoring and implementation. The work of the
group proved to be extremely contentious by the usual standards of the EHEA,
giving rise to ‘difficult discussions’ within the BFUG (Bergan and Deca 2018: 320).
In effect, as detailed in the section below, the group’s deliberations touched directly
on the different visions which the participating states might hold of the nature of
the EHEA itself—in particular, pointing to differing understandings of the nature of
the ‘commitments’ made within the process and the extent to which these could or
should give rise to more or less public and constraining instruments of enforcement.
1.2 The Advisory Group on Non-Implementation
The group worked from early 2016 through early 2018, following the usual for-
mat with regular meetings and regular reports to the BFUG.4 It decided early on
to concentrate only on the (non-)implementation of three key commitments: (1).
A 3-cycle system compatible with the EHEA Qualifications Framework and mak-
ing use of ECTS; (2). Compliance with the Lisbon Recognition Convention; and
(3). Quality Assurance in compliance with the European Standards and Guidelines
(ESG), implying external QA performed by independent agencies, preferably those
registered on the European Quality Assurance Register (EQAR). While recognising
that these commitments ‘in no way represent all EHEA tools, reforms and common
values’, the group nevertheless stressed that these commitments ‘are central to the
Bologna Process’ and that ‘their correct implementation is a necessary prerequisite
to any higher education system that embraces the fundamental values of the Bologna
Process’ (EHEA-AGNI 2016a).
The scope of the commitments to be (initially) dealt with thus defined, the group
moved to tackle the question of how implementation might be improved. The initial
work of the group in this regard appeared broadly consistent with the ‘collective
enforcement’ approach identified above, again stressing that ‘the Bologna Process
4The major proposals and regular reporting documents produced by the group (including the
documents cited below) are conveniently collected at: http://www.ehea.info/cid105406/ag-non-
implementation-2015--2018.html, last accessed on 16.12.2019.
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will lose credibility if no consequences are visible for non-implementation’ (EHEA-
AGNI 2016: 3). An initial proposal was drafted and discussed for an eight-stage
cyclical process to deal with non-implementation, whereby national problem areas
would be identified by an implementation committee on the basis of regular national
reports (1), leading to a request for information from the state concerned (2). The
state would then reply to the committee (3), opening a dialogue (4) and developing an
action plan (5) on which the implementation committee would provide feedback (6).
Progress would then be subject to regular updates within the normal cycle of business
defined by ministerial conferences (7). Data would further be collected and collated
in viewof the nextministerial conference (8).Non-implementation procedureswould
be ‘highlighted’ during ministerial conferences, allowing for exchanges and follow-
up in a new cycle. The implementation committee, as envisaged in this original
model, would be a standing committee of the BFUG, made up of BFUG members
and external experts where relevant. Pointedly, in this first draft, states subject to
non-implementation procedures would have been excluded from membership of the
non-implementation committee.
Work continued in this vein through much of 2016 and 2017, including the pre-
sentation of two draft model letters that would be sent respectively to countries with
‘good’ implementation records and to those where implementation was deemed to be
‘insufficient’ (EHEA-AGNI 2017a). Yet, though the proposal appeared to have gar-
nered substantial (majority) support, it was also clear that significant apprehensions,
if not outright opposition, also existed in relation to the approach adopted.
These doubts and oppositions found clear expression at the meeting of the BFUG
in Tartu in November 2017, at which a number of states, led by France, made clear
that they could not accept the proposal on the table. The French delegation argued
against a systemwhich they arguedwould ‘stigmatise’ rather than ‘encourage’ states,
further noting that the process lacked adequate legal and governance provisions to
move in the direction proposed. They were joined by Italy and Russia, as well as to
varying degrees by a number of other states, in this opposition (EHEA-AGNI 2017b).
Faced with this opposition, the advisory group was sent back to the drawing board
to work out a new compromise, with a Flemish proposal based on the use of ‘reverse
peer groups’ emerging from the discussions as the most likely way ahead. Meeting
jointly with representatives of Working Groups 1 (Monitoring) and 2 (Implementa-
tion) in Brussels in December 2017, the group sought to thrash out the contours of a
new proposal, in particular seeking to allay French (and others’) fears that the initially
envisaged approach would risk appearing to put countries ‘on trial’ (EHEA-AGNI
2017c).
This led to the proposal of a new document on ‘Support for the Implementation
of Key Bologna Commitments’, communicated to the BFUG meeting in Sofia in
January 2018 (EHEA-AGNI/WGI 2018a). Relative to the earlier model, the new
proposal streamlined the cyclical procedure (reduced to six steps with less onerous
administrative requirements) and significantly changed the tone of the overall pre-
sentation so as to stress its essentially supportive character—‘a change in overall
language to better reflect the positive and incentive-based aspects of the process’
(EHEA-AGNI/WGI 2018b). Crucially, the role of the implementation committee in
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identifying national problem areas was also removed from the process. This would
be replaced by a practice of self-identification as regards both areas where countries
sought additional assistance and areas where countries felt themselves positioned to
offer such assistance on the basis of the successful implementation of commitments.
Under the revised proposal, after the collection and collation of data for the
Bologna Implementation Report prior to each ministerial conference (1), states will
then self-identify as having successfully implemented key commitments or as hav-
ing not or insufficiently implemented such commitments, expressing an interest in
joining one or more peer groups on this basis (2). The Bologna Implementation
Group will then play a coordinating role, facilitating the constitution of peer groups
on the basis of the responses received (3). The peer groups will then begin their
work, initially focused on the three key commitments already identified above (4).
The peer groups will regularly update the Bologna Implementation Committee on
their progress (5), and countries will then submit their reports on implementation
prior to the next ministerial conference, restarting the cycle (6). Positive implemen-
tation experiences may be highlighted at the ministerial conference, while provision
is also made to bring to the attention of the conference any instances where countries
have failed to make significant progress on the implementation of key commitments
across two reporting cycles. It would then be for the ministerial conference to make a
(political) determination as to such action as might be taken in these circumstances.
It is this revised proposal that was adopted by the May 2018 Paris ministerial
conference. The overall trajectory of the drafting process bears underlining. Having
started from a comparatively strong ‘collective enforcement’ position, significant
(minority) resistance produced a progressive push back, ultimately resulting in the
adoption of a model clearly on the ‘peer learning’ end of the spectrum. This, indeed,
is evidenced in the final document itself, which describes the adopted model in the
following terms:
The proposal follows the Bologna philosophy of peer- and process review which fits well
with the collegiate and improvement-oriented ethos of the EHEA and aims to make imple-
mentation of key commitments more transparent (EHEA 2018a).
Reflecting the general tenor of developments, it is perhaps noteworthy that the Paris
ministerial conference was also the first time since 2003 when national implemen-
tation reports were not made publicly available for all EHEA member countries
(leaving this option open only for those countries that specifically wanted to make
their self-reporting available to wider audiences).
1.3 From Paris to Rome
The 2018 Paris communiqué devoted two sections to questions of implementation,
noting the progress made but also affirming that continuing efforts must be under-
taken so as ‘to unlock the full potential of the EHEA’ (EHEA 2018b). Echoing the
terms of the Yerevan communiqué three years earlier, the conclusions to the 2018
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ministerial meeting further noted that better implementation may only be achieved
through ensuring ‘a full ownership’ of the agreed reforms across the EHEA, engag-
ing governmental and institutional actors as well as staff, students, and the wider
community of stakeholders.
As noted above, the Paris meeting further agreed to proceed on the basis of the
final, revised proposals put forward by the Non-implementation Advisory Group
togetherwith theWorkingGroup on Implementation. To that end, the period since the
2018 meeting has seen the constitution of a Bologna Implementation Coordination
Group (BICG) as well as three peer groups dealing with the three key commitments
identified as being of central importance for ensuring the credibility of the EHEA:
the qualifications frameworks and ECTS; recognition (including both the implemen-
tation of the Lisbon Recognition Convention and the Diploma Supplement); and
quality assurance.
At the time of writing, the three peer groups have been constituted and have
begun to lay the foundations for their work, both identifying thematic orientations
and clarifying the concept of peer support itself (BICG2019a). There has been a good
overall uptake as regards participation in the groups. As of November 2019, there
are 24 countries participating in the qualifications framework group, 38 countries
in the recognition group and 37 countries in the quality assurance group (BICG
2019b). Only one jurisdiction (the United Kingdom as regards England, Northern
Ireland and Wales) has not (as yet) manifested its intention to participate in any of
the peer support groups. Of course, the jury must remain out at this stage as to the
effectiveness of the newly agreed process, which will be reviewed at the scheduled
June 2020 ministerial conference in Rome. Some speculative observations might,
however, be permitted as a means to frame future discussions.
On the one hand, the model adopted offers a perhaps underestimated possibility
for process learning. Thematically focused peer exchange may effectively allow for
both the identification of common impediments to the fulfilment of key commitments
and the means by which these may be overcome. It may also, perhaps even more
importantly, facilitate a deepening and reshaping of our understanding of those com-
mitments, helping to ensure their continuing relevance. For example, group work in
the area of recognition could push beyond a simple scorecard approach to understand
how recognition operates in practice across the EHEA, at both official and institu-
tional level, in terms that could better facilitate mobility without necessarily insisting
on a (perhaps unattainable, if not undesirable) convergence of institutional forms.
This view of the process, relative to the models outlined at the beginning of
this section, would see it fully embrace its potential as a model of peer learning,
concerned not only with the implementation of existing commitments but also in
creating dynamic processes of iterative adaptation. In relation to wider concepts
of soft governance, this corresponds to the logic of the influential experimentalist
governancemodel of Sabel and Zeitlin (2010: 3), which specifies that ‘the framework
goals, metrics, and procedures themselves are periodically revised by the actors who
initially established them, augmented by such new participants whose views come
to be seen as indispensable to full and fair deliberation’.
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On the other hand, there is, of course, no guarantee that the processwill necessarily
realise this full potential. Moreover, given the model agreed, it appears unlikely that
the operation of the process will satisfy those whose primary concern is that of
ensuring the consistent, if not uniform, implementation of key commitments at the
level of individual participating states. Viðarsdoóttir (2018: 397) gives voice to such
concerns in her discussion of the model adopted, making an appeal (unheeded at
Paris) for the adoption of a stronger sanctioning mechanism within the process:
The most notable problem with the model as proposed is that it contains no endpoint and
no obvious consequences for those countries who are either unable or, more worryingly,
unwilling to participate in it and for whom no improvement is noted over the course of the
cycle. It is theoretically possiblewithin themodel as it stands that it becomes a perpetual cycle
of “support” for countries in which no improvement is ever seen or judged likely. Having
noted the near standstill that some countries have come to with regard to the implementation
of some key commitments makes it necessary that an escalation or endpoint to the model
be put forward for discussion and eventual decision by the EHEA ministers at their next
conference in Paris in 2018.
Across these two positions, there is perhaps also a further point to be made concern-
ing research on the EHEA. It is clear that participating states have differing views
of the nature of the ‘commitments’ which they have made in joining the process
and that these are expressed in terms that often call to mind the differing ‘worlds of
compliance’ identified by Falkner et al. (2005; 2008) in their studies of the imple-
mentation of EU directives. These ‘cultures of compliance’ deserve more attention
in the context of the EHEA, not only as a means to understand differing patterns and
degrees of implementation, but also as potentially structuring factors that must better
be accounted for in our overall conceptualisation of the limits and possibilities of the
EHEA itself.
2 The EHEA as a Policy Forum
As a voluntary inter-governmental process, which ‘has soft law in its DNA’ (Harmsen
2015: 796), the structures of the EHEA readily lend themselves to functioning as a
policy forum, facilitating policy dialogue and peer learning for its member countries
as well as between the European Higher Education Area and other interested parties
worldwide.While the previous section discussed the tensions between those wishing
to move to stricter interpretations of what it means to be an EHEA member country
and those emphasizing the need to focus (only) on policy dialogue as a tool to reach
the commonly assumed goals, this section will look at this wider dimension, taking
stock of how the Bologna Process has developed itself as a policy forum in recent
years. Attention is first focused internally on the (limited) development of the social
dimension, before turning to the Bologna Policy Forum and the EHEA’s efforts to
engage in enhanced dialogue and cooperation with other global regions.
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2.1 The Social Dimension
The social dimension of higher education is deemed essential in order for higher edu-
cation to fulfil its societal mission, especially in view of contributing to social cohe-
sion in theEHEAmember states.As social policy broadly conceived is par excellence
an area of national specificity and jurisdiction, policy dialogue was considered to be
the bestway forward bywhich theEHEAcould support each higher education system
tomeet the goal of inclusive higher education. One particular three-year (2012–2015)
project—Peer Learning for the Social Dimension (PL4SD)5—foresaw a number of
activities that were aimed to support EHEA countries in their efforts: drafting country
profiles regarding existing policies on social inclusion, two peer learning activities at
the European level, and developing a database of over 300 good practice examples as
well as three in-depth country reviews. Besides the PL4SD project, the Report of the
Working Group on the Social Dimension and Lifelong Learning was complemented
by a dedicated strategy for the topic, bearing the title ‘Widening Participation for
Equity and Growth: A Strategy for the Development of the Social Dimension and Life-
long Learning in the European Higher Education Area to 2020’. However, despite
the call made in the 2009 Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve ministerial communiqué for all
countries to set ‘measurable targets for widening overall participation and increas-
ing participation of underrepresented groups in higher education, to be reached by
the end of the […] decade’, less than 20 % of systems had set targets for inclusion
for under-represented groups in 2015 (EACEA 2015). It was mainly the countries
that had anyway focused on the social dimension (Belgium–Flemish Community,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, etc.) that could show concrete progress when the latest EHEA implemen-
tation report was being drafted (EACEA 2018). It can, therefore, be argued that peer
learning works primarily when the involved parties are already ready, willing and
able to pursue a specific agenda. Since the EHEA member countries left out this
dimension when identifying key Bologna Process commitments, it is highly likely
that the EHEA will focus on its ‘policy forum’ role and attempt to promote innova-
tive ways of increasing the policy learning process for willing and interested parties,
without attempting a more coercive approach, despite the modest progress made in
the past decade.
5PL4SD was developed by the Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna (Austria), in partnership with
a number of partners including the European Students’ Union (ESU) and was funded by the Euro-
pean Commission. More information can be found at: https://www.esu-online.org/?project=pl4sd-
social-dimension-observatory-sdo, last accessed on 16.12.2019.
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2.2 The Bologna Policy Fora—Between Policy Export and
Global Dialogue
The issue of policy dialogue between the Bologna Process and other regional ini-
tiatives first appeared in the EHEA context in the Berlin ministerial communiqué
(2003), where the ministers sought to encourage cooperation with other parts of the
world, namely by opening Bologna events to those interested coming from non-
Bologna countries. It was, however, not until 2007 that a report on the Bologna
Process in a Global Setting was drafted (Zgaga 2007) and a Strategy on the External
Dimension of the EHEA was adopted by Bologna Process member countries. The
Strategy focused on five main policy aims: ‘1. Improving information on the EHEA;
2. Promoting European higher education in order to increase its attractiveness and
competitiveness; 3. Strengthening cooperation based on partnership; 4. Intensifying
policy dialogue and 5. Furthering recognition of qualifications’ (Bologna Process
2007).
The fourth policy priority focused specifically on intensifying policy dialogue
and it was further detailed by the work of the Bologna Working Group on Euro-
pean Higher Education in a Global Setting (2007–2009), which recommended that
ministerial conferences should be complemented by Bologna Policy Fora, as events
opened to non-EHEA members. Five such Bologna Policy Fora have been organ-
ised since 2009, back to back with each EHEA ministerial conference. The Bologna
Policy Fora enjoyed initial enthusiasm from EHEA and non-EHEA members alike,
but political participation dropped significantly in the following editions. The format
ranged from plenary debates only to a combination of plenary debates and thematic
parallel sessions, with a recent gradual opening of the EHEA ministerial sessions to
non-EHEA countries in order to increase the attractiveness of the event.
These events have been largely deemed unsatisfactory, due to various reasons: lack
of political focus evident in the superficial discussions between participants, insuf-
ficient political representation (in recent years particularly from the side of EHEA
countries), lack of follow-up in between these events, and a general difficulty in find-
ing the right balance between national interests and internationally relevant topics of
discussion (Bergan and Deca 2018: 313–314). The relative lack of involvement of
non-EHEA members in organising these events has also led to a European centric
approach that lowered the level of relevance for non-European dialogue participants.
In the experience of one of the authors in organising an edition of the Bologna Policy
Forum, most EHEA ministers were more interested in organising parallel meetings
with minsters with whom they had something to discuss rather than being involved
in an attempt to make the overall event more adapted to their interests. The final list
of participants, despite being a BFUG prerogative, was always heavily influenced
by the interests of the country organising the Bologna Policy Forum. This meant
that sometimes the invitations went out very late, and the concept was rather a poor
attempt at reconciling overarching EHEA (and oftentimes EU, due to funding allot-
ted for the event) interests and the foreign policy priorities of the host. But these
organisational aspects were not the only factors weighing in on the success of the
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five editions of the BPF. The discussions that revolved around the preparations of
each edition always involved a clash between those mainly considering the policy
dialogue aspect (which emphasised the need also to focus on the priorities of those
outside of the EHEA) and the EHEA members which were more interested in the
‘export’ value of the event (e.g. prior to the first BPF, the European Commission put
forward a proposal to promote ‘Bologna labels’—a tool that would recognise the
efforts of countries that wish to align their higher education system to the EHEA,
without actually becoming members).
Despite the difficulties encountered by the EHEA as a whole to make the BPF
a success, EHEA members have successfully intensified their policy dialogues in
various contexts. Notably, the European University Association (EUA) forged solid
partnerships with counterparts in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the European Stu-
dents’ Union (ESU) increased its global student dialogue with the help of UNESCO,
and the EU intensified its efforts to expand its Erasmus programme to non-EHEA
countries, etc.
Perhaps someof the difficulties faced by theBPF to fulfil its purpose are also linked
with the lack of enthusiasm of the countries with globally competitive higher educa-
tion systems to embark on a common EHEA promotion effort. One telling example
is the failure of the Information and Promotion Network, which was designed to
support the International Openness Working Group in the 2010–2012 timeframe
with enhancing the exchange of good practices related to HE promotion and to work
towards an EHEA plan in this sense. The reluctance of many of the members actually
to embark on EHEA wide efforts to promote not just their higher education system
but the EHEA as a brand prompted the group to not ask the BFUG to renew its man-
date, though the group nevertheless stressed the need for more concerted marketing
efforts, which would pre-suppose financial efforts (EHEA-IOWG 2012). The Euro-
pean Commission funded a project in 2015 to further the activity set out in the IPN
Terms of Reference, but its implementation gave rise to several conflicts between
higher education promotion agencies.
2.3 Is the EHEA a Successful Policy Forum in All of Its
Dimensions?
Looking at the relative achievements of the EHEA in its attempts to become a policy
forum, both for its members and for interested external parties, a few observations
can bemade. Firstly, the topics onwhich the debates aremost constructive in terms of
policy learning are those that benefit from an overlap with national political priorities
(structural reforms, recognition, etc.) or by a non-challenged prominence (e.g. trans-
parency tools). In other cases, such as for the social dimension of higher education,
the effectiveness of the soft governance mechanisms, which mainly rely on policy
dialogue, are limited by factors outside of the EHEA’s reach—political prioritisation
and stability, national socio-economic context, perceived role of the higher education
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sector, capacity etc. Furthermore, the limits for policy dialogue are also set by the
perceived or presumed added value of the EHEA for each individual member—in
the case of EHEA’s policy dialogue with other regions, some aspects are seen as
best kept in the national remit, such as international marketing efforts, especially for
those that would not necessarily benefit from a very strong image of the EHEA to
the detriment of marketing efforts for their national system.
The influence of the wider political climate must also be borne in mind, marked
by growing levels of Euroscepticism. European values have been challenged in a
number of countries, from the rule of law to freedom of expression and university
autonomy. This policy mood could not remain without consequences, and the EHEA
has seen a lack of appetite even for some of its initial trademarks (such as the publicly
available national implementation reports). In this context, policy dialogue could not
remain untouched and the effectiveness of this tool will depend on the willingness of
national and institutional representatives to buck the political trend, which appears in
many cases to point towards a more inward-looking approach to policy. These past
years have also brought the issue of fundamental values in the EHEA to the forefront,
as any effective policy learning process must be embedded in a community of shared
purpose and values. The next section will look at how some of the debates on EHEA
values have evolved and will discuss the potential need to focus more on this aspect
if the EHEA is to continue to be a successful policy forum in the future.
3 The EHEA as a Community of Values
The Bologna Process, from the outset, has represented a ‘community of values’.
The 1999 Declaration notably made explicit reference back to the 1988 Magna
Charta Universitatum, which set out a broad, humanist vision of the university as an
autonomous institution rooted in an expansive vision of academic freedom and the
unity of teaching and research.6 These underlying values themselves have not, how-
ever, for the most part been subject to explicit monitoring within a process that has
largely concentrated on more technical questions of structural reform as discussed
in previous sections.
Recent developments have, nevertheless, pointedly underlined that core principles
of academic freedom and institutional autonomy cannot be taken for granted across
the member states of the EHEA. Reflecting this situation, a 2016 background docu-
ment surveyed key issues surrounding academic freedom and institutional autonomy
across the EHEA and further raised the question of what role the EHEA itself might
play in the promotion or defence of such core values (Bergan 2016). This challenge
6The declaration is available on the site of the Magna Charta Observatory at http://www.magna-
charta.org/resources/files/the-magna-charta/english, last accessed on 16.12.2019. The Charter has
acquired a resonance well beyond its initial European context, and as of mid-December 2019 had
been signed by 889 universities in 88 countries.
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was then, in turn, taken up in the 2018 Paris communiqué, which strongly affirmed
these ‘fundamental values’ in one of its opening paragraphs:
Academic freedom and integrity, institutional autonomy, participation of students and staff
in higher education governance, and public responsibility for and of higher education form
the backbone of the EHEA. Having seen these fundamental values challenged in recent years
in some of our countries, we strongly commit to promoting and protecting them in the entire
EHEA through intensified political dialogue and cooperation (EHEA 2018b).
On the basis of this affirmation, a task force has been established ‘for future moni-
toring of values’, with a view to making a proposal for adoption at the 2020 Rome
ministerial meeting. This task force is essentially confronted with two main chal-
lenges.
On the one hand, it is clearly a number of high-profile, egregious violations of
core principles of institutional autonomy and academic freedom that have led to the
renewed interest in bringing themonitoring of such values into the process.Worrying
developments may be identified across a range of EHEA countries, including high
profile cases such as the measures taken by the Erdoğan government in Turkey in the
aftermath of the failed 2016 military coup or the actions of the Orbán government in
Hungary as regards theCentral EuropeanUniversity in the context ofwider restrictive
moves concerning academic freedom.
Yet, it is precisely in such severe instances of the limitation of academic freedom
that the EHEA is arguably least able to act because of the political sensitivity of
the issues raised. As Bergan and Deca (2018: 317) comment, ‘Facing challenges
in the implementation of one’s national qualifications framework is one thing, and
the responsibility lies squarely with the public authority responsible for education.
Facing challenges in implementing democracy and human rights is quite another
story, and it is not one that lies primarily in the remit of the Minister of Education’.
While one may find it regrettable, this comment accurately reflects the limits of the
EHEA, which cannot reasonably be extended to encompass a wider political dimen-
sion. Indeed, its core logic and structures reflect these limits, essentially providing
for monitoring as regards the (non-)fulfilment of commitments, in terms qualitatively
different from an enforcement mechanism designed to allow for the sanctioning of
violations.
The partial exception in this regard has been the case of Belarus, which had
initially been refused admission to the EHEA (Gille-Belova 2015) and was then later
admitted only on condition of following a ‘roadmap’ of supervised post-accession
reform (cf. EHEA 2018c). Even here, however, there has been significant political
pressure from a number of participating states to end the country-specific monitoring
process, despite clear evidence of the non-fulfilment of key commitments.
On the other hand, this leaves open the question of what may reasonably be
accomplished within the process. Relative to this challenge, the most useful starting
point is to take stock of the situation at the European level as regards the existence of
relevant benchmarks and standards. Here, as Matei and Iwinska (2018) convincingly
argue, a notable imbalance may readily be detected, in which a comparatively well-
articulated European model of ‘university autonomy’ has emerged in recent decades,
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but in the absence of a correspondingly well-developed notion of academic freedom
as a necessary complement and counterweight. The EuropeanUniversityAssociation
has effectively played a strong agenda-setting role (Nok and Bac 2014), notably
through the development of its national university autonomy scorecards, framing the
discussion in terms reflecting the concerns of its membership (essentially university
rectorates/central administrations). As such, a conception of autonomy has emerged
that is primarily shaped by organisational considerations. The central focus has been
to ensure that university leadership has the necessary capacity to respond to the
growing external demands placed on higher education institutions—the product of
a generalised ‘autonomy-accountability two-step’ (Harmsen 2014). Individual level
academic freedom has, however, been relatively little considered within this wider
policy turn, and may indeed have suffered significant erosion in the face of both
increasing managerial centralisation and the growing importance within universities
of externally defined priorities (cf. Christensen 2011).
The EHEA process might thus usefully address this situation by focusing on a
definition and monitoring of academic freedom. In part, this may build on existing
work that has mapped a range of possible indicators that could be used in such an
exercise (Karran and Terence 2017). Beyond the identification of indicators, further
(and potentially more difficult) discussions will also be required as to how or where
such monitoring might fit in relation to existing EHEA structures. While one might
conceive of new structures, the more likely option would see an academic freedom
dimensionmapped on to existing reporting requirements in relation to the implemen-
tation report, to peer support structures or (in some proposals) to quality assurance
mechanisms. Consideration might further be given to expanding the range of sources
used and/or actors involved in reporting beyond the self-reporting of participating
states—though, depending on the specific mechanisms adopted, this evidently risks
being an area of considerable political sensitivity.
Overall, if considerations of academic freedom (or other fundamental values) are
to be brought within the process, it is thus very likely that their treatment will be
fundamentally shaped by the limits and possibilities of the existing soft governance
model, rather than marking a significant departure from this model as regards any
putative (let alone punitive) notion of enforcement. With this, we thus return, in
our conclusion, to a balance sheet concerned to understand the operation of this
distinctive governance model as it has evolved over the past two decades.
4 Conclusion
Reflecting its soft law character, perhaps the most important accomplishment of
the EHEA continues to be that of the construction of an ‘agora’ or of a ‘policy
space’ as noted in the introduction. The EHEA continues to facilitate structured,
continent-wide dialogue on major issues of higher education policy to an extent
largely unparalleled in other global regions. The major focus and most productive
areas of discussion remain those concerned with the structural reform of higher
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education systems, where clearly articulated European-level templates have emerged
as shared reference points, even if their implementation remains uneven (see below).
Beyond a core of structural reform issues, where participating states have often
appeared willing to invest in the European process so as to gain added leverage
for desired, difficult changes at the domestic level, developments have been more
limited. The much discussed, but relatively little acted upon social dimension of the
Bologna Process is a case in point. As discussed above, significant advances in this
area have to date appeared largely restricted to a small group of participating states
already committed to relatively ambitious policy agendas, with the European-level
influence as such appearing correspondingly marginal. It remains to be seen whether
this will change in the aftermath of the upcoming 2020 Rome Ministerial Meeting,
where ministers will be invited to adopt a set of Principles and Guidelines on the
Social Dimension.7
Implementation remains uneven, here again reflecting the character of a soft law
process whose basic design does not lend itself to providing for strong mecha-
nisms of enforcement. The contentious discussions surrounding the work of the non-
implementation working group between the Yerevan and Paris ministerial meetings
(2015–2018) provided a stark representation in this regard of both the in-built limits
of the process and the differing understandings of it across the participating states. A
proposed move to create a still comparatively light-touch form of ‘authority’ in the
process, allowing for states to be identified as non-compliant and to be required to
develop a monitored action plan to address the indicated shortcomings, was blocked
by a vocal minority of participating states. Instead, a final compromise was reached
which relies entirely on self-identification and voluntary peer support groups—and
this in a context where the previously systematic publication of country-specific
implementation reports had also slipped off the table. Underlying this controversy
were two quite distinct, contradictory views of the Bologna Process itself. On the one
hand, there are those countries (including France, Russia, Greece, Poland, Spain and
Italy) which appear to view the ‘voluntary’ character of the process as not permitting
any meaningfully binding enforcement of the commitments entered into within it.
On the other hand, there also appears to be a larger group of countries (including
the Nordic states, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom) who view
the ‘voluntary’ character of the process as applying only to the initial decision to
join, after which they hold that there should be an enforceable obligation to abide
by the commitments entered into. As previously highlighted, these different under-
standings of the process, and the ‘worlds of compliance’ that underlie them, have
been comparatively neglected in research on the Bologna Process and merit much
greater scrutiny going forward.
This, in turn, connects the EHEA to thewider European political landscape, where
it cannot entirely escape the rise of Euroscepticisms and the growing forms of ques-
tioning of the European political project. Like all forms of European cooperation at
7The draft of the European Principles and Guidelines to Strengthen the Social Dimension of Higher
Education available at the time of writing the article was last accessed on 16.12.2019, at: http://
ehea.info/Upload/BFUG_FI_TK_67_5_5b_AG1_Principles_and_Guidelines.pdf.
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present, the Bologna Processmust now invest greater efforts in securing its own legit-
imacy, pushing beyond a comparatively narrow policy community.More directly, the
EHEA is also faced with growing threats to its fundamental values, most particu-
larly as regards core tenets of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. How
or whether the process is able to deal with such threats—effectively affirming its
foundational principles while not succumbing to the risks of a potentially destabil-
ising politicisation—will undoubtedly be one of the major challenges of the coming
years. The potential development of a definition and indicators of academic freedom
within the EHEA context may, for example, prove to be something of a litmus test
of both the possibilities and limits of the normative ‘soft power’ of the process.
Finally, as a governance model, the experience of the EHEA to date affords us
some potentially interesting lessons of wider applicability. The process has displayed
a significant degree of innovation in the creation and deployment of a diverse toolkit
of policy instruments. Evolving practices of benchmarking, stocktaking and peer
learning have been introduced, refined, and reformed over the course of the past
two decades. Such practices, moreover, sit within the framework of a wider policy
community that has displayed strong socialising dynamics, developing shared tem-
plates and understandings of higher education policy across the continent. Despite
markedly uneven patterns of implementation, the anchoring of these broad struc-
tures is in itself an important achievement. It is the nature of this achievement which,
moreover, points to the direction of future development for the process. As in the
past, the EHEA will be able to advance only by a careful calibration and adaptation
of policy instruments to realities on the ground—fostering consensus, facilitating
learning and prodding participating states towards the individual fulfilment of col-
lectively defined objectives where necessary. As such, it will also continue to be an
exemplary instance of soft governance in practice, illustrating both the possibilities
and limits of a governance model that must—in the absence of both significant legal
constraint and substantial financial resources—ultimately rely on normative suasion.
References
Bergan, S. (2015). The EHEA at the Cross-roads: The Bologna Process and the Future of Higher
Education. In A. Curaj et al. (Eds.), The European Higher Education Area: Between Critical
Reflections and Future Policies (pp. 737–752). Cham: Springer.
Bergan, S. et al. (2016). Academic Freedom and Institutional Autonomy – What Role in and
for the EHEA? Background document prepared for the thematic session at the meeting of the
BFUG, Bratislava, 8-9 December. http://ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/20161024_Podgorica/
75/1/Board_SK_ME_51_5_FundamentalValues_642751.pdf, last accessed on 16.12. 2019
Bergan, S., & Deca, L. (2018). Twenty Years of Bologna and a Decade of EHEA: What Is Next?.
In Adrian Curaj et al. (Eds.), European Higher Education Area: The Impact of Past and Future
Policies (pp. 295–319). Cham: Springer.
BICG (2019a). Bologna Implementation Coordination Group, Update to the Bologna Follow-
up Group, BFUG Meeting 65, Bucharest, 26 March. http://www.ehea.info/Upload/65_BFUG_
meeting_Bucharest/BFUG_RO_MK_65_6_BICG.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
434 L. Deca and R. Harmsen
BICG (2019b). Implementing the Bologna Key Commitments through Peer Support, Draft Final
Report, BFUG Meeting 67, Helsinki, 12-13 November. http://www.ehea.info/Upload/BFUG_
FI_TK_67_5_1_BICG.pdf, last accessed on 17.12.2019.
Bologna Process. (2007). European Higher Education in a Global Setting: A Strategy. Oslo: Norwe-
gianMinistry of Education and Research, September. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/
EHEA_in_a_Global_Context/24/2/Strategy_plus_possible_actions_597242.pdf, last accessed
on 16.12.2019.
Chou,M. H., & Ravinet, P. (2015). The rise of ‘higher education regionalism’: An agenda for higher
education research. In J. Huisman et al. (Eds.), The Palgrave International Handbook of Higher
Education Policy and Governance (pp. 361–378). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Christensen, T. (2011). University Governance Reforms: Potential Problems of More Autonomy?.
Higher Education, 62(4), 503–517.
Dakowska, D., & Velarde, K. S. (2018). European Higher Education Policy. In H. Heinelt & S.
Münch (Eds.), Handbook of European Policies: Interpretive Approaches to the EU (pp. 260–
272). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
EACEA. (2018). The European Higher Education Area in 2018: Bologna Process Implementation
Report. Brussels: Education, Audio-visual and Culture Executive Agency. https://publications.
europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/2fe152b6-5efe-11e8-ab9c-01aa75ed71a1/
language-en?WT.mc_id=Selectedpublications&WT.ria_c=677&WT.ria_f=706&WT.ria_
ev=search, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EACEA. (2015). The European Higher Education Area in 2015: Bologna Process Implemen-
tation Report. Brussels: Education, Audio-visual and Culture Executive Agency. https://
eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/european_higher_education_area_bologna_process_
implementation_report.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EACEA. (2012). The European Higher Education Area in 2012: Bologna Process Implementation
Report. Brussels: Education, Audio-visual and Culture Executive Agency. http://www.ehea.info/
media.ehea.info/file/2012_Bucharest/79/5/Bologna_Process_Implementation_Report_607795.
pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA. (2018a). Paris Communiqué, Appendix 1: Structured peer-based support for the implemen-
tation of the Bologna Key Commitments, 24-25 May. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/
file/2018_Paris/77/3/EHEAParis2018_Communique_AppendixI_952773.pdf, last accessed on
16.12.2019
EHEA. (2018b). Paris Communiqué, 24-25 May. http://www.ehea.info/Upload/document/
ministerial_declarations/EHEAParis2018_Communique_final_952771.pdf, last accessed on
16.12.2019
EHEA. (2018c). Advisory Group 2, Support for the Belarus Roadmap: Final Report, submitted
to the BFUGMeeting, Sofia, April. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/2018_Paris/72/3/
MEN_conf-EHEA_AG2_03_950723.pdf. last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA. (2017). Policy Development for New EHEA Goals: Final Report. October. http://www.
ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/2018_Paris/72/7/MEN_conf-EHEA_WG3_03_950727.pdf, last
accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA. (2015a). The Bologna Process Revisited: The Future of the European Higher Edu-
cation Area. 15 May. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/2015_Yerevan/71/1/Bologna_
Process_Revisited_Future_of_the_EHEA_Final_613711.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA. (2015b). Yerevan Communiqué, 14-15 May. http://www.ehea.info/Upload/document/
ministerial_declarations/YerevanCommuniqueFinal_613707.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA. (2012). ‘Making the Most of Our Potential: Consolidating the European Higher
Education Area’, Bucharest Communiqué, 26-27 April. http://www.ehea.info/Upload/
document/ministerial_declarations/Bucharest_Communique_2012_610673.pdf, last accessed
on 16.12.2019
EHEA-AGNI/WGI. (2018a). Support for the Implementation of Key Bologna Com-
mitments: Proposal to the BFUG from Advisory Group 3 on Dealing with Non-
Implementation and Working Group 2 on Implementation, BFUG Meeting 58, Sofia, 31 Jan-
Taking Stock of the Bologna Process at 20 … 435
uary. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/20180205-06-Sofia/71/7/BFUG_BG_SR_58_
4c_AG3WG2Proposal_889717.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA-AGNI/WGI. (2018b). Explanatory Note by Advisory Group 3 and Working Group 2
to the proposal to aid implementation of Bologna key commitments, BFUG Meeting 58,
Sofia, 31 January. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/20180205-06-Sofia/71/7/BFUG_
BG_SR_58_4c_AG3WG2Proposal_889717.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA-AGNI. (2017a). Draft Letter (Specimen) to Countries: Proposal to the BFUG from AG3 on
Dealing with Non-Implementation, BFUG Meeting 54, Gozo, 16 May. http://www.ehea.info/
media.ehea.info/file/20170524-25-Gozo/34/4/BFUG_MT_NO_54_5f_3_AG3_DraftLetter_
765344.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA-AGNI. (2017b). Notes from AG Discussion in Tartu, 12 December. http://www.ehea.info/
cid119426/ag-non-implementation-2015-2018.html, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA-AGNI (2017c). Advisory Group 3: Dealing with Non-Implementation, Minutes,
Brussels, 7 December. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/20171207-Brussels/49/1/
AG3Minutes5meeting_901491.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA-AGNI. (2016a). Advisory Group 3 Dealing with Non-Implementation: Working Paper 1,
presented at BFUG Meeting 50, Amsterdam, 7 March. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/
file/20160307-08-Amsterdam/23/0/BFUG_NL_MD_50_8a_AG3_working_paper_I_615230.
pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA-AGNI. (2016b). Advisory Group 3: Dealing with Non-Implementation, Minutes,
Reykjavik, 12September. http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/20160912-Reykjavik/04/4/
AG3_20160912_Reykjavik_Minutes_832044.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
EHEA-IOWG. (2012). Bologna-Follow Up International Openness Working Group Report. 2009-
2012 http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/2012_Bucharest85/8/IO_WG_Final_Report_
605858.pdf, last accessed on 16.12.2019
Falkner, G. et al. (2008). Compliance in the Enlarged European Union: Living Rights or Dead
Letters? Aldershot: Ashgate.
Falkner, G. et al. (2005). Complying with Europe: EU Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member
States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garben, S. (2011). EU Higher Education Law: The Bologna Process and Harmonization by Stealth.
Dordrecht: Wolters Kluwer.
Garben, S. (2010). TheBolognaProcess: FromaEuropeanLawPerspective.European Law Journal,
16(2), 186–210.
Gille-Belova, O. (2015). The Limits of the European Higher Education Area: The Case of Belarus,
European Journal of Higher Education, 5(1), 83–95.
Harmsen, R. (2015). Future Scenarios for the European Higher Educational Area: Exploring the
Possibilities and Limits of “Experimentalist Governance”. In A. Curaj et al. (Eds.), The European
Higher Education Area: Between Critical Reflections and Future Policies (pp. 795–813). (Cham:
Springer).
Harmsen, R. (2014). The Governance of the Global University: Leadership and Policy Challenges.
In S. Bergan et al. (Eds.), Leadership and Governance in Higher Education: A Handbook for
Decision-makers and Administrators (supplemental Volume 2014-3, pp. 36–52). Berlin: Josef
Raabe.
Haskell, B. (2009). Weak Process, Strong Results: Cooperation in European Higher Education. In
I. Tömmel & A. Verdun (Eds.), Innovative Governance in the European Union: The Politics of
Multilevel Policymaking (pp. 273–288). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Huisman, J. (2019). The Bologna Process in European and Post-Soviet Higher Education: Insti-
tutional Legacies and Policy Adoption. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science
Research, published online 25 March. https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2019.1597686, last
accessed on 16.12.2019
Huisman, J. et al. (2012). Europe’s Bologna Process and its Impact on Global Higher Education.
In D. K. Deardorff et al. (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of International Higher Education (pp.
81–100). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
436 L. Deca and R. Harmsen
Karran, Terence et al. (2017). Measuring Academic Freedom in Europe: A Criterion Referenced
Approach. Policy Reviews in Higher Education 1(2), 209–239.
Matei, L., & Iwinska, J. (2018). Diverging Paths and Institutional Autonomy in the EuropeanHigher
Education Area. In A. Curaj et al. (Eds.), European Higher Education Area: The Impact of Past
and Future Policies (pp. 345—368). Cham: Springer.
Nokkala, T., & Bacevic, J. (2014). University Autonomy, Agenda Setting and the Construction of
Agency: The Case of the European University Association in the European Higher Education
Area. European Educational Research Journal, 13(6), 699–714.
Ravinet, P. (2008). FromVoluntary Participation to Monitored Coordination: Why European Coun-
tries feel increasingly bound by their commitment to the Bologna Process. European Journal of
Education, 43(3), 353–367.
Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin, J. (Eds.). (2010). Experimentalist Governance in the European Union:
Towards a New Architecture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sin, C., Veiga, A., & Amaral, A. (2016). European Policy Implementation and Higher Education:
Analysing the Bologna Process. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Viðarsdoóttir, U. S. (2018). Implementation of Key Commitments and the Future of the Bologna
Process. In A. Curaj et al. (Eds.), European Higher Education Area: The Impact of Past and
Future Policies (pp. 387–400). Cham: Springer.
Zgaga, P. (2012). Reconsidering the EHEA Principles: Is There a “Bologna Philosophy”?. In A
Curaj et al. (Eds.), European Higher Education at the Crossroads: Between the Bologna Process
and National Reforms (Part 1, pp. 17–38 ). Cham: Springer.
Zgaga, P. (2007). Looking Out: The Bologna Process in a Global Setting. On the
“External Dimension” of the Bologna Process. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Education
and Research. https://media.ehea.info/file/WG_External_dimension/34/3/ExternalDimension_
report2007_581343.pdf, last accessed on 16. 12. 2019
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
